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of jurimetrics - or even a simple curiosity in raw data. As a result, a custom of
annually producing statistical information about the High Court may be harder to
develop.
This article aims to redress that deficiency through the presentation of tables
quantifying various features of the High Court's recent work, with particular
emphasis upori'its constitutional law decisions. There is, however, a difficulty for
the empiricist in that the case law to be garnered from a single year would be too
small a sample from which to observe any significant patterns and trends. The
solution arrived at has been to abandon that constraint - instead, this paper
concerns the almost five years from Chief Justice Gleeson's arrival at the Hizh
Court in May 1998 until the retirement of Gaudron J on 10 February 2003. As
such, it represents a snapshot of the Court's handling of constitutional matters
over recent years which aims to helpfully supplement more traditional forms of
analysis of the same material.
THE GLEESON COURT ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: AN
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS FIRST FIVE YEARS
I INTRODUCTION
In providing a reflective comment upon the High Court's constitutional law
decisions of a single calendar year - that of 200 II - Stephen Gageler
ack.nowledged that to do so was largely to adopt an American tradition found
within the pages of the Harvard Law Review for over half a century now.? But, as
he said, in the beginning there were the statistics. The American commentary on
the Supreme Court's term began its life as a foreword to the presentation of
tables and charts indicating 'some of the more significant features of the Court's
activity'] across that period.
The practice of critiquing recent developments in constitutional law, albeit
through the lens of a particular year, is one which we can adopt without much
difficulty.' The work of the High Court of Australia in this field is already
subject to a healthy amount of analysis - a steady stream in fact - from the
profession, academia and, to some extent, the media. Australian lawyers have,
however, been largely reticent about the use of empirical studies as a means of
appreciating the dimensions of judicial work.' Not for us, the number crunching
II THE HARVARD LAW RE VIE fV TRADITION
Before considering the statistics themselves and explaining the means by
which they were compiled, some comment upon the practice and purpose of this
kind of work may be helpful.
The Harvard Law Review's employment of statistical analysis did not
suddenly emerge of its own accord with the 1949 volume's review of the
Supreme Court's 1948 term." Seemingly the impetus for this development lay in
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the success of an earlier series of articles by then Professor Felix Frankfurter in
co-authorship with various others." The Frankfurter articles provided statistics
from the Court's 1928 term but broke off when their chief author was appointed
to the subject of his study and continuation of the series would have been,
presumably, slightly unseemly." When the student editors of the Harvard Law
Review revived the practice ten years later, they owed a debt to those earlier
works for the example set.? This debt extended to the editors' apparent belief
that, following on from Frankfurter and company's earlier work, they could
simply present the tables of data with only fairly minimal explanation as to their
purpose, let alone method of compilation. The editors of the 1961 volume
attempted to remedy these deficiencies through greater detail on both scores, 10
but in the 1968 volume the editors provided further practical detail after making
the following admission:
Growing concern in recent years over the accuracy of some of the tables -
primarily those which attempt to classify cases by subject matter - has led to
suggestions that part or all of the enterprise be substantially revised, if not
completely abandoned. At a minimum, it was felt, the nature of the errors likely to
be committed in constructing the tables should be indicated so that the reader might
assess for himself the accuracy and value of the information conveyed. I I
Thus qualified, the tables have survived. As a quantitative method tried, tested
and occasionally modified for over fifty years, they obviously hold enormous
sway over researchers attempting to perform similar work in other jurisdictions.
Of course, a straight application of the Harvard Law Review's rules of statistical
compilation to the practice of the High Court of Australia is not possible.
Account must be taken of the different practices and procedures between this
institution and that of the United States Supreme Court, and the rules adapted
accordingly.'? But it should be acknowledged at the outset that much of the
methodology employed in preparing this paper is influenced by that which is
used year in, year out by the Harvard Law Review.
What is the purpose or value of empirical research? As distinct from the
reasoning contained in the Court's opinions - quite often elusive and subject to
competing interpretations by commentators - statistics appear to provide
certainty, at least in answering questions of a particular nature: How many cases
have been decided over a period? On which areas of law? What is the level of
agreement across the Bench on various issues? What is the propensity of the
Bench to unanimity? Is there any regular pattern of voting amongst the justices of
the Court on certain issues? Which justices dissent more frequently than others?
The importance of discovering such information lies in how it may assist us to
appreciate the way in which the work of the Court is performed, and the
complexity of the legal controversies which face it. This feeds in to more familiar
scholarship about the Court, and the legal reasoning of its members. For
example, an awareness of the number of cases decided over a period may well be
relevant to those examining the efficiency of the institution's procedures or the
adequacy of its resourcing. A breakdown of those cases by topic may illuminate
which areas of the law are in a state of instability or change at any given time.
This information would certainly be supplemented by indications as to which
issues tend to fragment the bench, and the degree of such disagreement. Strong
evidence of regular voting blocs or alignments may point to the security of any
particular view from being overthrown in the foreseeable future. And lastly,
statistics on dissent may well attest to a marked difference in methodology or
ideology amongst the justices which is ripe for scrutiny and comment by
outsiders.
tt is, of course, possible to discuss all of these sorts of matters without any
reliance upon statistical research and, on the whole, [ would agree that Australian
legal scholarship has not suffered unduly for the absence. So keenly is the Court
observed that [ suspect we appreciate intuitively much of what is to be confirmed
empirically. That is not to say, however, that basic data about the High Court and
its judges would not further enhance or support many of the arguments and
hypotheses which are regularly aired in academic journals. In many instances, it
would. Also, there remains not just simple validation of our opinions and
perceptions, but the potential for new avenues of research to be illuminated by
statistical information.
Lastly, it is appropriate to acknowledge the limitations which inhere in
empirical work and the need for it to exist in relation to, and be supported by,
more qualitative analysis. For this reason, I would endorse the advice of the
Harvard Law Review editors when they cautioned the wary that their tables 'are
not an end in themselves but are intended to present a foundation for more
detailed consideration"!' Because the compilation of statistics requires the
consistent application of a reasonably rigid methodology it is inevitable that the
figures produced may, by themselves, present an overly simplistic picture.':' It
certainly will not be the whole picture. There are a-number of useful counters to
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II Above n 9.
12 See Andrew Lynch. 'Dissent: Towards a Methodology tor Measuring Judicial Disagreement in the High
Court of Australia' (2002) 24 SI'C/II'~l-' Law Review 470.
13 Above n 3,
14 As Blaekshield h"s said. 'like any iutcllccrualmcthod. quantitative analysis involves great simplifications,
as one seeks to reduce (1 disorderly mass of empirical data lo conceptual manageability': Blackshicld,
'XIYIZlN Scales: The High Court of Australia, 1972-197(,', above 11 5. 134,
36 UNSW Law Journal Volume 26(1) 2003 The G,.cson Court all Constitutional Law: All Empirical Analysis 37
this. One is to design a justifiable methodology which is well suited to the
material under examination. IS Another is then to be explicit about those instances
where distorting effects are inevitably produced by application of the
methodology to particular sorts of cases. Additionally, accumulating even the
very basic statistical information which [ am aiming to present here poses
occasional problems of complexity requiring the exercise of discretion." The
choices made by the researcher should be flagged so that others may be aware of
the degree of subjectivity employed in the study's completion. In these ways, the
inevitable shortcomings of anyone particular approach and the results produced
are made apparent. This does not diminish the usefulness of such research -
rather, such transparency ensures that reliance upon it is well informed and
reinforces the notion that quantitative studies should not stand alone, but be used
in conjunction with complementary scholarship of a more discursive character.
was always going to be preferred. 19 Secondly, although certainly every
constitutional law case from the period is reported in the CLRs, the authorised
series is not as comprehensive as the ALRs with respect to other matters. As shall
be seen, this was important so as to allow consideration of the constitutional
cases against the totality of the Court's opinions over the period.
,~
III SOME STATEMENTS ABOUT METHODOLOGY
B Period Covered - The 'Natural Court'
The timeframe for this study commences, appropriately enough, on 22 May
1998 with the appointment of Murray Gleeson as Chief Justice of the High
Court. The stability in the Court's composition from that time until Justice
Gaudron's departure on [0 February 2003 presents us with what is known as a
'natural court' and one which is of a suitably long duration.P A 'natural court' is
a court 'where the same Justices interact for the whole research period"." With
the appointment of Heydon J, a new 'natural court' of the Gleeson era effectively
comes into being.P
Consequently, reports of cases heard prior to the Chief Justice's arrival, even if
judgment was delivered subsequently, are not tallied. For example, the decision
in Chappel v Hart23 was handed down on 2 September 1998, but as the case was
heard in November 1997, it must be seen to predate the formation of the Gleeson
Court. This is the only instance where the hearing date of the matter is invested
with any significance - and it is for the purpose of exclusion. Otherwise, cases
are organised into years on the basis of when judgment was delivered.> But in
order that the significance of the five 2003 cases. handed down before Justice
Gaudron's retirement may be sensibly contextualised. the 2002 results reach over
to include those of early February 2003.
In preparing statistics on the Gleeson Court's work pertaining to constitutional
law over the last five years, essentially one is rarely called upon to do anything
more complicated than tally as one goes through the relevant reports. 17 However,
the simplicity of much of this activity is underpinned by consistent application of
a fixed classificatory system. It is necessary to briefly highlight the key features
of the method adopted.
A Report Series
Although recent empirical studies of the High Court have all used the
Commonwealth Law Reports ('CLRs') as the source for their data.!" two
considerations led to my use of the unauthorised Australian Law Reports
(' ALRs') for this research. Firstly, the ALRs commended themselves by virtue of
the speed with which they are produced relative to the CLRs. In order to ensure
that as much of the entire sample period had been reported and so diminish, as
much as possible, reliance upon electronic resources, the series quickest to print
15 This is something of a balancing act. Again, Blackshield admitted: 'we need a set of categories simple
enough 10 be usable, but complex enough to illuminate the intricacies and inconsistencies of the human
mind': Blackshield, 'XIYIZ/N SCH1cs: The High Court of Australia. 1972-1976'. above n 5, 134,
Admittedly, this WHS in thc context of his much more sophisticated 'scalogram' project but thc essential
tension which he highlights would seem universal in any research aiming to quantify an aspect ofhuman
existence.
16 This is the central theme and substance of my paper above 11 12.
17 It is a similar story in respect of the Harvard Law Review which admitted that the construction of similar
tables 'is accomplished primarily through tabulations ns mechanical and simple as counting': above 11 9.
301.
I to: Sec. cg. above n 5.
19 At the time ofwriting, the Australian LOll' Reports were so up to date as to be almost complete. The dare
of thc last judgment delivered by thc High Court and reported in that series is 5 December 2002 (R I'
Carroll (2002) 194 ALR I), By comparison, thc Commonwealth La»: Rel'0rlS had only just reported thc
judgments in Yarmirr I' Nor/hem Terri/or" (200 I) 208 CLR I which was delivered on II October 2001.
This case was reported in (2001) 184 ALR 113. The reason Ails/Lit was not simply used for the entire
study is that the organisation of material on that site would have posed difficulties in ensuring nil cases
for the relevant period were included. With the exception or recent cases. case law is not organised
chronologically by Ails/Lit. Thus. the possibility or overlooking relevant cases in the alphabetical lists or
through usc of the search engines mitigated against use of that resource lor the bulk ofthe study.
20 Thc justices in thc natural court under study and their dates of appointment arc Gleeson CJ (22 May
19%). Gaudron .r (6 February 1987), McHugh J (14 February 1989). Gummow .I (21 April 1995). Kirby .I
(6 February 1996). Hayne J (22 September 1997). allLl Callinan .I (3 February 199X).
21 Russell Smyth, 'Judicial lnteractiou on thc Latham Court'. above n 5, .134. For a detailed example or
selecting a 'natural court' to study. see Tony Blackshicld, 'Quantitative Analysis: The High Court of
Australia. 1%4-1969'. above n 5. II.
22 Youngsik Lim, 'An Empirical Analysis ofSupreme Court Justices Decision Making' (2000) 29 '/0111'1I,,1
II(Leg"t Stndics 721. 724; and Blackshicld. 'XlVtZ/N Scales: The High Court or Australia. 1972-1976'.
above n 5, 139. '
2.1 (1998}IS6ALRS17,
24 In doing so. I am both acting to my own preference and uiming to be consistent with the approach taken
by Gagclcr. above n I. 195. For an example or the reverse approach. sec Petcr.l McCormick. 'The Most
Dangerous Justice: Measuring Judiciu! Power 011 the Lamer Court 191) 1-97' (I 99lJ) 22 Dallunrsh: LUll'
Journal 93.97.
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Tallying of cases for the entire period involved drawing on the reports found
within volumes 156 to 194(1) of the ALRs. The final High Court case found in
that series was handed down on 5 December 2002, leaving only ten eligible cases
of the relevant period unreported. These cases have still been included in the
study, using the judgments posted on the Austl.Il webpages."
But additionally, I have widened the net so as to include cases which involved
questions of state constitutional law of which there were but three out of the total
of62.29
The catchwords appearing in the headnotes of the ALRs indicate the
involvement of constitutional issues and have been relied upon for classification.
Admittedly, the~degree to which constitutional questions were central to the
resolution of these cases varied. But wherever constitutional principle arose,
regardless of the dominance of other legal questions, the case was included in the
core group under analysis.'? In some instances the descriptors chosen by the
reporters do not necessarily reflect the constitutional point for which the case has
become significant, but instead focus on other constitutional considerations."
While this may have undesirable warping effects (particularly in Table C which
aims to represent the subject matter of constitutional litigation in the High Court
over the five years), classification in this way has the advantage of being
objective, transparent and replicable by other scholars.
C The 'Control' Sample
All High Court cases reported in the ALRs across this period were tallied in
order to provide some broader context against which to examine the Court's
constitutional work. This included any report where written reasons were
recorded - including those involving an application for special leave.
Excluded from the study were reports of single judge decisions of the High
Court. The only reported decision which requires further comment here is that of
Hancock Family Memorial Foundation Ltd v Porteousl': which was a brief two
judge decision (McHugh and Gumrnow JJ) denying special leave. This has not
been included either.
One of the advantages of considering the control sample is that it is certainly a
larger pool of cases from which to draw statistics. Although this paper is
focussing particularly upon constitutional cases, it is admitted that, for some
purposes," cases within that niche are not of such a quantity as to form a large
enough group for analysis. Nevertheless, they are all that emanates froIII the
natural court under examination. To some extent, concerns about drawing
conclusions from an analysis of just those constitutional cases may be allayed by
looking for similar trends in the total sample which may provide corroboration.
D What is a 'Constitutional Case'?
In identifying 'constitutional cases' as a group within the total sample, I have
essentially adopted Stephen Gageler's definition as being
that subset of cases decided by the High Court in the application of legal principle
identified by the Court as being derived from the Australian Constitution. That
definition is framed deliberately to take in a wider category of cases than those
simply involving matters within the constitutional description of 'a matter arising
under this Constitution or involving its interpretatiou'i-"
E Basic Classificatory Terms: Unanimity, Concur-rence and Dissent
The central purpose in compiling these statistics has been to quantify the
number of unanimous judgments, concurrences and dissents delivered by the
Court and its members in the last five years. Although it may seem superfluous to
explain these terms, some basic definitional clarity is essential if anything is to be
gleaned from the figures themselves. This may be briefly done through the
statement of three core rules which governed this exercise.
(a) A separately-authored statement of opinion as to how a case should be
resolved is recorded as a separate judgment (concurring or dissenting)
regardless of whether reasons are given or not.
For the purposes of tallying, unanimity has only been recorded when all sitting
justices deliver the one written opinion. A decision may be 'unanimous through
the conglomeration of separate concurrences, but unless there is a single opinion
signed-off on by the entire Court, no unanimous judgment is recorded here. This
is at variance with other empirical studies which tend to regard a separate
judgment that does no more than indicate agreement with the opinion of another
('I concur' is the classic example) as de facto co-authorship of the judgment
agreed with. Indeed the Harvard Law Review has long adopted this approach." I
have indicated a preference elsewhere for resisting this trend where it is not
useful for the particular purposes of the research '! - as it is, for example, in
25 See <hup.z/www.austlii.cdu.au> at I() June 2003.The ten cases nrc Graham Barclay Oysters Pt.', Ltd \'
R."·(//1[2002J HCA 54: Do",' Jones & Co lnc v Gutnick (2002] He A 56: Roberts " Bass [2002J HeA 57:
Members or the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal ('11/'"11"";1.1' v Victoria [2002J HCA 58; Aktiebolaget Hassle ,.
Alphopharm Ply Ltd [2002J HCA 59: Re Minister ./ill· lnnnigratinn and Mnlticnltura! and II/(Iige",,,,s
A/Toil'S; Ex parte Applicants S134/2002 [2003J HCA I; Plaillli/rS 15 7/2002 " Connnonweotth ofAnstralia
[2003] HCA 2; Anstin v Commonwealth ofAnstralia [2003J HCA 3; NewSouth Wales v Lepore; Smnln v
Queensland; Rich v Qlleellxlalld [2003J HCA 4; Bnru! Besser Ma."'"II:" UII/iled (110'" Bored Ma.wII/:" Ltd)
"ACeC [2003] HCA 5.
26 (2000) 175 ALR I.
27 Chiefly those involving a yearly breakdown such as Table A (II). below.
2S Gagclcr, above 11 I. 195.
29 These cases were Egan " Willis (1998) ISS ALR 527; Ourlunn Hnidings PI)' LId ,. Nell' SOil/II Wales
(2001) 177 ALR 436; and Mobil Oil Australia Ply Ltd •.. Victoria (2002) IS9 ALR 161 (which also
involved a question of Commonwcnlth judicial power).
30 See, eg, OJL v Central AutllOrily (2000) 170 ALR 659.
31 See. cg, the catchwords prefacing Austral Pacific: GroliP Lid (ill li'l) \. Airservtces Australia (2000) 173
ALR 619. Thcse concern S 51(i) and s 51(xxxi) but do not indicate the C01ll1's concern in that decision
with distinguishing a fee for services from H tax, I um grateful to one of the anonymous referees for this
example.
32 Above n 9, 302.
33 Lynch, above n 12.
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Russell Smyth's recent work on the identification of coalition voting blocs in the
High Court." My position is that unanimous or joint judgments require actual co-
authorship and this may be contrasted with the situation where, despite apparent
total agreement (though Co per warns against assuming this)35 a justice speaks for
himself or herself, regardless of the brevity. In this context, it seems best to
recognise such concurrences for what they are: matters of substance duly
acknowledged, it is clear that what has been delivered is most accurately
regarded as a separate, concurring judgment."
(b) A justice is considered to have dissented when he or she voted to dispose of
the case in any manner different from the final orders issued by the Court."
Like the preceding rule, this is a slight - albeit important - modification of the
Harvard Law Review method. Those rules talk not of 'final orders' but 'the
majority of the Courr" - indicating the relative ease with which majorities have
traditionally been identified in the United States Supreme Court.'? However,
identification of a majority can be a less certain exercise in respect of a court
which issues opinions in seriatim. Not only does the Court as an institution not
have a judgment written for it - there is the increased likelihood that there may
not even be a majority of justices in favour of one particular result. The lack of a
clear majority is an accepted incident of our judicial method - the final orders
will reflect varying points of consensus amongst the judgments, but not
necessarily the orders favoured by any readily discernible majority of the Bench,
or even those of anyone justice.
It would be a mistake to use the absence of an identifiable majority as a
censure on the finding of a dissent - in such cases, the Court as an institution still
states a result, albeit reached by composite. Instead, to enable the noting of
dissent without the assistance of a majority opinion issued 'for the Court' as a
counterpoint, .dissension in judicial bodies giving seriatim opinions should be
classified as dIsagreement with the orders issued by the Court. Indeed, this is
demanded by the standard definition of dissent, which places more emphasis
upon the relationship between a dissenting judgment and the orders made by the
court as an institution than the differences in reasoning across the presiding
judicial officers." It is the former which is determinative of the judgment's
status, even though the latter is obviously instrumental in the creation of that
institutional position.
The second thing to note here is the insistence that disposition of the case in
any manner different from the final orders results in a judgment being tallied as
dissenting. This is a direct derivation from the rules applied by the Harvard Law
Review which also sees fit to add that 'opinions concurring in part and dissenting
in part are counted as dissents' .41 I have outlined elsewhere the distorting effect
which the strictness of this approach may have in particular cases by magnifying
the true extent of disagreement in the Court," but this is the inescapable by-
product of the need to insist upon clear and consistent application of these
concepts in order to produce a statistical picture. As said earlier, an awareness of
that limitation and a willingness to supplement the quantitative results through a
more considered analysis of the substance of the opinions are the only ways to
offset the traditional deficiencies of this sort of work.
(c) Opinions that concur in the orders of the Court, even if not belonging to any
actual majority, are not dissenting.
This rule really just serves as a corollary to the last one. Having denounced the
notion of 'majority' as unhelpful in indicating dissent in .courts which deliver
judgments in seriatim and replaced in its stead the yardstick of the Court's final
orders, it seems worth pointing out the surprising results which may accrue. Of
the seven justices in any case, there may be fewer ill favour of the final orders
than are opposed (either in whole or part) - in which case the number of
dissenters exceeds those who concur in the Court's result. The classic example of
this is the 3:3: I split in the decision of Dennis Hotels Ptv Ltd v Victoriar?
wherein only Menzies J concurs completely with the result which the Court
reached as an institution. The irony is well appreciated - his Honour's view of
34 Sec Smyth. 'Judicial Interaction on the Latham Court'. above n 5. 333: Smyth. 'Explaining Voting
Patterns on the Latham High Court 1935-50'. above n 5. 101: Smyth. 'Acclimation Effects for High
Court Justices 1903-1975', above n 5.175.
35 A simplc ' agree' judgment 'is no different in substance from being a parry to a joint judgment, although
care must be taken to leave no doubt about what it is with which the Justice agrees'; Michael Copcr,
'Concurring Judgments' in Tony Blackshicld, Michael Copcr and George Williams (cds), The Ox/ill'd
Companion to II,,, ffigl, Court ofAustralia (200 I) 129-30.
36 It must be admitted that this is hardly a problem of much practical significance 10 the crises involved in
this study. My central concern with allowing a fluidity between these two situations is that it risks
obscuring the signi ficancc of when the justices choose to speak together by writing jointly. as opposed to
the many instances where they simply defer to the solution proposed by one of their number. Even apart
from any symbolic importance 01' enhanced prcccdential value which may attach to a unanimous opinion,
clearly a different process has taken place in the Court's determination of the mailer than when au
individual author is agreed with. It seems undesirable to lose that nuance unless necessary for a particular
purpose. Additionully, the level of agreement between the justices can be reflected in other ways (such as
thc tallying or voting alignments in Tables E (I) and (II) of this paper. below) which do not threaten this
distinction.
37 Additionally, this nile will not apply in cases where the final orders nrc determined by application of l.I
procedural rule (for example, resolution of deadlock between an even number or justices through usc of
the Chief Justice's casting vote). This type of case should be discounted from any study attempting 10
quanti fy dissent. No case of this sort arose in the period under examination here.
38 Sec. cg, (198R) 102 Harvard Law Review 143.350,
39 There have been complaints in recent times that the Court's 'opinions sometimes exhibit a Byzantine
complexity that borders on self-caricature. to such an extent that it becomes a "Herculean task" to try to
determine "whether an actual majority exists behind any proposiuon'": McCormick. above n 24. 9B. It is
not u problem or which the Supreme Court justices nrc uuuwarc: Ruth Bader Ginsburg. 'Remarks 011
Writing Separately' (1990) 65 Washington LOll' R(!\'iell' 133, 14X-50.
40 See John Alder, 'Dissents in Courts of Last Resort: Tragic Choices?' (2000) 20 o.yrort,/./o/ff'fllll (~/Let:al
Studies 221, 240; Copcr, above n 35: ljaz Hussain. Dissentlng' and Separate Opinions at tlu: ,·f/o,.ld Co",.1
119H4) H: Michael Kirby, 'Law at Century's End' (2000) I M"c,!""";,, /'<11,' .Jo",.",,1 I, 13: Donald E
Lively. FOl'es/IlI£!0I1'S ofthe Lou': S/fIJI"(,;'lIIe Court Dissents (fmtC'ol/stitlftio"al Development (1992) x x ;
Andrew Lynch. 'Dissenting Judgments" ill TOllY Blackshicld, Michucl Caper and George Williams (eds),
The Oxton! Companion 10 tlu: High Co",.1 or Australia (2001). 21(,-S: Lynch. above 11 12.476-7:
McCormick, above n 24, 102-3.
41 Above n 38.
42 Lynch, above n 12, 4S 1-3, 4S7-9 I, 49S-500.
43 (1960) 104 CLR 259.
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the matter as a whole clearly appeals to none of the other justices, yet its
reflection in the Court's order leads to a classification of the other six opinions as
dissenting. As Kadzielski and Kunda have said of this phenomenon, 'although
this may be somewhat unrealistic, the totals [tallied] do reflect the number of
judges who, over the course of the year, deviated from the actual legal decisions
which were produced by the courts considered as units"."
However, to put this unusual (though I would stress not illogical) consequence
into some kind of perspective, I should add that only one matter from the period
under examination displayed this feature."
whilst the other half were determined without dissent. A unanimous opinion was
written in almost 15 per cent of these cases.
Some explanation of the columns in the above table is necessary. Given the
Chief Justice's arrival in late May 1998 and the exclusion of decisions which
predate his arrival, it is unsurprising that the column for that year features fewer
cases than the others. Although the sample from that year is undeniably small, it
probably still warrants separate presentation - if only so as to avoid inflation of
the figures for 1999. The same cannot be said of the cases delivered by the Court
in 2003 but before Justice Gaudrori's departure. There seems little to be gained
by presenting these in isolation and so they have been absorbed into the statistics
for 2002. Similar considerations guide the structure of the following table.
IV THE STATISTICS
TABLE A (II) -'ALL CONSTITUTIONAL CASES REPORTED FOR PERIOD
A The Gleeson Court's Casework - The Institutional Perspective
TABLE A (I) - ALL HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA CASES REPORTED
FOR PERIOD
1998 [999 2000 2001 2002-03 TOTAL
1 2 [ [ 0 5
Unanimous
(33.3%) (10.0%) (6.2%) ([0.0%) (0.0%) (8.0'y'.)
By I 3 8 4 7 23
Concurrence (33.3%) (15.0%) (50.0%) (40.0%) (53.8%) (37.0%)
Majority 1 15 7 5 6 34
Over Dissent (33.3%) (75.0%) (43.7%) (50.0%) (46.1%) (54.8°1..)
3 20 16 10 13 62TOTAL
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) ([00%) (100%)
[998 [999 2000 200[ 2002-03 TOTAL
2 12 5 [ [ 6 36
Unanimous
( 15.3%) (17.6%) ([0.0%) (16.6%) (9.3%) (13.7%)
By 6 [6 22 22 26 92
Concurrence (46.1%) (23.5%) (44.0%) (33.3%) (40.6%) (35.2%)
Majority 5 40 ?' 33 32 133-.)
Over Dissent (38.4%,) (58.8%) (46.0%) (50.0%) (50.0%) (50.9%)
13 68 50 66 64 261TOTAL
([00%) ([00%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Table A (f) displays the extent of the High Court's case load over the sample
period and indicates how individual matters were resolved by the Bench. As
indicated above, the purpose of preparing statistics on all the Court's work is to
enable some point of comparison in respect of how it responds to constitutional
problems. Of the total 261 matters tallied for the Court, half were split decisions
With Table A (II) we tum to the central topic under examination - the Gleeson
Court on constitutional law. At a total of 62 cases, the Court's constitutional
work over the period represents close to a quarter of its entire load. Even so, in
respect of individual years, I suspect the number of cases is just too few to make
any particularly firm conclusions. The proportion of decisions resolved over a
dissenting minority has increased, but admittedly not by as much as we might
have anticipated given the lesser significance of precedent as a constraint in this
context. To the extent that dissension is greater in such matters, it appears to
impact more potently upon the likelihood of unanimity rather than just agreement
per se.
Table B indicates the resolution of these constitutional cases in closer detail:
44 Mark A Kadziclski and Robert C Kunda, 'The Unmaking 01' Judicial Consensus in the 1930" An
Historical Analysis' (19~3) 15 University ofWes! Los Angeles Law Reviev: 43. 47.
45 Lie ,. Relilgee Review Tribunal (SR9 of 1999) reported at Muin v Relilgee Review Tribunal (2002) 190
A LR 60 I. The two matters contained in this report were each tallied separately (sec explanatory notes).
though only Lie l' RcJitgc:e Review Tribunal resulted in a majority of dissenters. The orders in that matter
were arrived at by composite ofthe various diverse opinions (no fewer than live). Only Justice Gaudrou's
judgment completely reflects the final orders at' the Court in this matter, Consequently. and in accordance
with the methodological constraints requiring absolute concurrence ill order to avoid dissent, there arc six
dissenting opinions.
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TABLE B - CONSTITUTIONAL CASES - HOW RESOL VED46 five year period produced a joint judgment from all seven members of the
Court.48
Table C is the final one dealing with the Court as an institution before we
move to consider the actions of its individual members. The purpose here is
simply to indicate the nature of the constitutional matters which have been before
the Court over the sample period. The standout group is what I have grouped
together as 'Federal Jurisdiction/Judicial Power/Ch III'. I concede that this is a
somewhat clumsy categorisation, but I cannot quite conceive another moniker
that could so briefly convey the essential themes of these cases, which seem to
return again and again to the same concepts and words in Chapter III of the
Commonwealth Constitution. It will be noted that the table weeds out the s 80
cases from the tangle that otherwise appears to sprout from this source, but even
those are comparatively frequent. Altogether, roughly half the High Court's
constitutional work since the Gleeson appointment has involved what Leslie
Zines memorably described as 'the doctrinal basket weaving that Chapter III has
generated'.49 The presence of inconsistency matters in second place in Table C,
below, is rather deceptive as four of the seven cases under that topic appear under
alternative topic listings, and probably derive their substantive character from
elsewhere than s 109. Of the other topics which are not simply one-offs, I do not
think there are any surprises. Questions of the place of the Territories, acquisition
of property and the implied freedom of speech have all been prominent over the
last decade. It would have been more surprising had any of these topics 110t been
represented. But even their relative rarity when contrasted with the domination of
questions of judicial power is perhaps somewhat unexpected,
Size of Bench Number of Cases How Resolved Frequency
Unanimous 1 (1.6%)
By concurrence 18 (29.0%)






By concurrence 3 (4.8%)










1 By concurrence 0(0.0%)(1.6%)
2:1 0(0.0%)
Unsurprisingly, the bulk of the constitutional cases were heard by a bench
comprising all serving justices, though the number of six-member benches is not
insignificant. Despite the complete absence of dissent in the remaining categories
of five and three-member courts, these are so few as to be relatively
inconsequential." So far as any clues as to dissent being evidence of the
marginalisation of an individual justice, we can see a sizeable percentage of 6: I
and 5: I decisions in the first two categories. But this is not especially notable in
respect of seven-member benches which showed a propensity to split in diverse
ways. It is more noticeable for the six-member benches, over half of which saw a
minority of one. It is striking that only one constitutional case over the almost
46 All percentages given in this table are of the totnl of constitutional cases (62).
47 FOl' those intrigued by which constitutional matters were resolved in this way, the bench in United
Mexican States v Cabal (200 I) 183 ALR 645 was comprised of only Gleeson CJ. Mcl-lugh and Gununow
JJ. The live member benches sal for HA Bachrach Ply Ltd t: State or Queensland (1998) 156 ALR 563:
Rndnll'hy " Ughllbol (1999) 167 ALR 105: Austral Pacific Group Ltd (in li'l) l' Alrserviccs Austrati«
(2000) 173 ALR 619: and Pasini I' United Mexican Stutes (20t)\) 187 ALR 409. All bar Rndolphy v
Lig"{!i}{Jt involved a question of judicial power.
48 Telstra Corponnion Ltd v Worlhing (1999) 161 ALR 489.
49 Leslie Zincs. 'The Present State ofCOIlSlitlitionallllterrrctatioll' ill Adrienne Stone and George Williams
(cds), The High Court at the Crossroads - £.1'.1'0".1' in Cumlilnliunal L(/1l'(2000) 238.
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TABLE C - SUBJECT MATTER OF CONSTITUTIONAL CASES50
Topic No of References to Cases
Cases
(156/563); (159/108); ([61/318); (162/1);
Federal
(163/270); (163/576); ([ 63/648); (1651171);
Jurisdiction/ Judicial 22
(168/616); (172/39); (172/366); (173/619);
Power/Ch ll!
(176/219); (176/545); ([ 76/644); (1771329);
(183/645); (187/409); (188/1); (I9l/543);
([ 92/217); [20031 HCA 2'
Inconsistency of Laws - s
7
(/61/318); (161/489); (163/501); (164/520);
[09 ([66/258); (169/607); (/76/545)
Right to Trial by Jury - s
6
(/64/520); ([ 66/159); ([ 66/545); (175/338);
80 (180/301); (185/111)
Territories 4 (/61/318); (/65//71); (168/86); ([91/1)
S 5 [(xxxi) 3 (160/638); (167/392); (176/449)
S51(xix) 3 (182/657); (193/37); (2003] HCA 2
Cross-Vesting of Power 2 (/63/270); ([7l/[55)
Implied Right to Freedom 2 (185/1); [2002] HCA 57tof Expression
Sovereignty 2 (/63/648); (184/113)
State Parliament
2 (158/527); (189/161)(powers of)
s 5 [(i) [ (/67/392)
s 5 [(xvii) 1 ([ 70/1 [ I)
s 5 lfxxxv) [ ([ 72/257)
ss 53 and 55 1 ([ 87/529)
s 64 1 (/82/657)
s92 [ (/63/501)
s 106 I (18l/37[)
50 The references in Table C arc to the Australian l.aw Reports citations by volume and page number, The
reader will notice that a few of the cases appear under two topics - one is listed thrice - these arc denoted
by usc of italics in respect of the repetition. This means that if you totalled the figures given in respect of
the number of cases for each topic you would exceed the total of 62 given in Table A (II). above. In actual
fact there arc less than 62 original references in Table C. If one discounts the II repeated references. one
is lert with only 56 original references. But what is the significance of this figure and where did the total
of 62 in Table A (II) come from'? The answer lies in the multiple tallying of four of the cases listed.
Although there arc only 56 case reports in constitutional law. 62 matters in total have been tallied. This
practice is discussed in the explanatory notes and employed in respect of all tables but this one and Table
F (Ill). below. Table C requires identification with the case report and cannot easily accommodate any
finer distinction. thus in this context the multiple matters present in (162/1); (163/270),; (176/644) and
(193/37) [Ire suppressed and each report stands as a single unit.
At the time of writing. the case of Plai"/i/!, S/j71]t)(}] I' C<""1I/01/11wt//, [2003] HCA 2 is yet to be
reported in the Australian Law Reports.
At the lime of writing. the case of Roberts I' Bass [2002] I·ICA 57 is yet to be reported in the Australian
Law Reports.
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s 114 1 (188/241)
s [ [8 1 ([ 72/625)
Right of Citizen to Resist
I ([ 70/659)Expu[sion
State Acquisition of
1 ( 177/436)Property ~
Common Law and the
1 ( 168/8)Constitution
Appointment of Senator to
I (167/105)Vacancy
Federal Implication
Limiting Commonwealth [ [2003] HCA 3"
Legislative Power
B The Gleeson Court's Casework - The Individual Perspective
The following tables aim to indicate some of the actions of individual High
Court justices over the period. Tables D (I) and (II) may be seen as further
investigation of what was examined in Tables A (I), A (II) and 8, above, as they
note the number of judgments written by each member of the Gleeson Court
either as part of a unanimous effort with his or her colleagues, or in concurrence
with, or dissent from them. Table D (I) presents this information in respect of all
cases, with D (II) dealing only with the constitutional subset.
TABLE D (I) - ACTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES: ALL CASES
Number of Participation
Judgments in Unanimous Concurrences Dissents
Judgment
Gleeson CJ 226 30(13.2%) 181 (80.0%) [5 (6.6%)
Gaudron J 201 20 (9.9%) 158 (78.6%) 23 (11.4%)
McHugh J 203 25 ([ 2.3%) 142 (69.9%) 36(17.7%)
Gummow J 222 29 (13.0%) [84 (82.8%) 9 (4.0%)
Kirby J 226 19 (8.4%) 130 (57.5%) 77 (34.0%)
Hayne J 2[7 27 ([2.4%) 177 (81.5%) 13(5.9%)
Callinan J 222 22 (9.9'1'0) 160 (72.0%) 40 (18.0%)
.'
At the lime of writing. the case of AIlS/iII I' COIIIIIIOlIII,'e"I//' [2003] HCA 3 is yet to be reported in the
Austrolian LOll' Reports.
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A number of comments may be made about these results. An obvious one is
that the rarity of unanimous judgments is borne out by the figures in respect of all
justices - they represent less than one sixth of the judgments signed off on by any
member of the Court. Of course, this is far from surprising given the size of the
High Court bench - Table B made it clear that unanimity is unlikely to flourish
with the addition of more judges with whom to disagree. But if we move across
this table we start to get an indication as to the level of consensus in the Court
and the impediments to greater unanimity. The rates of concurrence can be seen
as existing in three bands. Chief Justice Gleeson, along with Gaudron, Gummow
and Hayne JJ are all within 4 per cent of each other in respect of their fairly high
propensity to agree with the final result of the Court. Justices McHugh and
Callinan are slightly below this with 69.9 per cent and 72.0 per cent respectively.
Lastly, Kirby J is a marked outsider with only 57.5 per cent of his judgments
sharing in the Court's response - and he was also least likely to participate in a
unanimous opinion.
These three bands are borne out by a look at the dissent rate. Instantly we see
that Justice Kirby's level of dissent far outstrips (in fact is almost double) that of
his nearest brethren, McHugh and Callinan 11. With a dissent rate slightly in
excess of a third of all his opinions, Kirby J seems secure in cementing a position
as the High Court's 'Great Dissenter"." I am somewhat cautious about using this
title, most commonly associated with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes of the
United States Supreme Court.V As Shea has said, the remarkable thing about
Holmes was not so much 'the volume of his dissenting opinions, but the fact that
many of them, over the course of time, were adopted as controlling authority by
new majorities of Supreme Court Justices'." If it is on this basis that the title is
used, then only time will tell if it may fairly be applied to Kirby J with respect to
his formidable dissent rate. But if the simple delivery of minority opinions
suffices, Justice Kirby's nearest rival would be Murphy J, previously perceived
to be a somewhat exorbitant dissenter but who, with a rate of a mere 21.6 per
cent,54 now seems quite a mild case. Continuing to work backwards, McHugh
and Callinan 11 hover around 18 per cent - portraying them as reasonable
dissenters in their own right. It is still possible to group the remaining justices as
a third band, but admittedly it is a slacker one than formulated with respect to
concun'ences, due to Justice Gaudrori's dissent rate being almost equidistant to
that of McHugh J and that of Gleeson CJ. Justice Gummow's very low dissent
rate accords perfectly with his having the highest rate of concurrences.
Having looked through the table, the unanimity figures acquire a greater
perspective. Bespite any cohesiveness in outlook which we may tentatively
presume amongst Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne 11,;5 as a group of
four working alongside two judges with robust dissent rates and one whose
dissension is quite frankly phenomenal, it is no mystery why the relatively high
rates of concurrence do not translate into more unanimity. This is not simply to
suggest that it is the dissents themselves which are destructive of opportunities
for unanimous judgments - that much is obvious. Rather, my point is a wider one
_ the dissent rates indicate a general climate of pronounced individuality which
may be observed in those even more frequent occasions where there is a high
degree of concurrence across all sitting judges." Of course, a court which has
tended to follow the English tradition of seriatim opinion delivery is a natural
environment in which to find this trait. But the relatively low rate of unanimity is
especially worth commenting upon when one considers that upon his arrival as
Chief Justice, Gleeson implemented conferencing procedures with a view, if not
to building consensus, then at least to ensuring better communication and
exchange of ideas amongst the judges." But this hypothesis can be further, and
perhaps better, explored when we move to consider the voting alignments and
joint judgment authorship tables shortly.




Justice Kirby has indicated that he is U\VlU'C or his high rate of dissent: Kirby. above 1140.
[ say 'most commonly' as there is room for debate on this accolade, In support of Holmes as America's
'Great Dissenter', sec Alan Barth, Prophets '''ilh HOllOI' (1974) 6; Percival E Jackson. Dissent ill th«
Supremo CUIII" (1969) 3. Even in cormncutury which seeks to apply the label to other US justices, it is
clear that Holmes is the benchmark. if not the solitary wearer of the title. Sec. cg, Toni J Ellington, 'Ruth
Bader Ginsburg and John Marshall Harlan: A Justice and Her Hero' (1998) 20 Hawaii Law Review 797.
818 (involving comparison to the second Justice Harlan - and then extending thai comparison to Justice
Bader Ginsburg at 821-5); Thomas F Shea. 'The Great Dissenters: Parallel Currents in Holmes ami
Scalia' (1997) 67 Mississippi Law JUIII'IIO/ 397. 398 (involving comparison. obviously, to Justice Scalia);
Karl M ZoBell, 'Division of Opinion ill the Supreme COlIl1:A History of Judicial Disintegration' (1959)
44 Cornell Law Quarterl, 186. 202 (involving comparison to the lirst Justice Harlan).
Shea, above n 52,
Tony Blnckshield er "I (eds), The Judgments ofJustice Liollel 11411I1'/'."(1986) xvii-xix. Though. one must
be wary of H direct comparison given the Court's gaining control over its own docket and the abolition or
appeals from State Supreme Courts to the Privy Council since the time of Murphy J. I am grateful to
Professor Michael Coper for alerting me to this point.
55
56
This will be confirmed more directly by Tables E (I) and (11)and F (I) and (11), below.
Chief Justice Gleeson has acknowledged the "individualistic spirit of [the COIIl·t'S] members': Murray
Gleeson, The BoverLectnrcs - The Rille ofLaw and the Consntntion, Sydney. 2000 at 89.
See High Court of Australia. Annnal Repo!'11998-99. 5-6. The report states:
In the past, there has always been informal discussion 011 such matters. The new series of meetings
hus formalized the arrangements to a greater extent rlnd"providc the occasion for the review of
current thinking of the Justices concerning the cases reserved 1'(Jr decision .... The discussions will
1101 always secure agreement between the Justices and this is not their purpose. Even where
important differences exist, discussion call help to clarify and refine opinions and reasoning.
On coufcrcncing generally. sec Troy Simpson. 'Conferences' ill Tony Bluckshield, Michael Copcr and
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TABLE 0 (II) - ACTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES: CONSTITUTIONAL
CASES
Number of Participation
Judgments in Unanimous Concurrences DissentsJudgment
Gleeson CJ 59 5 (8.4%) 52 (88.1 %) 2 (3.3%)
Gaudron J 59 4 (6.7%) 49 (83.0%) 6(10.1%)
McHugh J 56 4 (7.1%) 41 (73.2%) 11(19.6%)
GUIlll110WJ 6\ 5 (8.1%) 53 (86.8%) I (1.6%)
Kirby J 59 3 (5.0%) 39 (66.1%) 17 (28.8%)
Hayne J 57 4 (7.0%) 49 (85.9%) 4 (7.0%)
Callinan J 56 I (1.7%) 40 (71.4%) \5 (26.7%)
There are several interesting features of this table, especially when compared
with the behaviour of the justices generally as evinced by Table D (1), above. The
likelihood of participation in a unanimous opinion is reduced for all, but the
concurrence and dissent rates take some fairly unpredictable tUI11S.All justices
with the exception of Callinan J display an increased propensity to concur in the
result of constitutional cases compared to their normal response. Admittedly, the
Chief Justice aside, the increase is rather slight and Kirby J is still least likely of
all other members of the Court to concur. Justice Callinan's decrease in
concurrence is so insubstantial as to remain steady for all intents and purposes.
What adds a dimension here is the change to the dissent rates. For one, Kirby J
has not only reduced his rate of dissent to 28.8 per cent, but he now finds himself
in very close company with Callinan J on 26.7 per cent - seemingly these two
judges are just as likely to be in the minority in a constitutional case as each
other, though of course, not necessarily in the same cases. Justice McHugh's rate
of dissent is also up but nowhere near as dramatically as that of Callinan 1. The
remaining four judges have not remained perfectly steady either - nor have they
fared similarly in a breakdown of these cases. Justice Hayne's dissent rate has
increased mildly. whilst Justice Gaudrou's has dipped. Chief Justice Gleeson and
Justice Gurnmow's dissent rates - which are already low in general - are
etTectively halved in respect of constitutional cases.
The purpose of Tables E (I) and (II) and F (1) and (II), below, is to indicate in
two distinct ways the levels of agreement existing between the individual
justices. Tables E (I) ancl (II) note the number of times each justice voted with
others to dispose of a case in the same way. As alluded to in Part Ill, above, I
have 110tadopted the stricture, employed by the Harvard Law Review and those
investigating voting blocs, of only seeing agreement where there is total
concurrence in the reasons for the vote - be it through co-authorship of the
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':ud(1\nentor a simple concurrence without more." Instead, in addition to these
:bla~nt forms of agreement, I have inclt~ded ~epara~e opinions which contain an
individual statement of reasons but which still arnve at the same result as the
COUlt. This is not to say that I reject entirely the 'reasons are more important than
the outcome~ approach." but upon reflection I think it has greater relevance in
the context of the United States Supreme Court where concurring judgments
represent a breaking away from - and thus something of a direct challenge to -
the reasons contained in the 'opinion of the Court'. In courts that give seriatim
judgments, it seems uncomfortably rigid to deny the existence of consensus
simply because it lurks behind individual expression. Certainly, the numerous
voices with which a majority may speak seem to cause little precedential angst
for subsequent courts - in fact, it probably provides a welcome flexibility. Where
this strict approach has been applied in respect of non-American decisions, it has
been to detect voting 'coalitions's" - a term I have consciously avoided using
here. I appreciate that 'coalition' emphasises a higher degree of cohesion than
arises when two judges independently reach the same outcome for very different
reasons. Those studies seeking to identify steady alliances of justices who
dominate the court's jurisprudence are perfectly right to discount individual
COI1CUl1'enceswhich bear an uncertain relationship to, and share only an
indeterminate commonality with, the approach of the rest of the majority. But
this only further illustrates the limitations of research into coalitions - given its
reliance upon such a strict premise, it will not recognise agreement in a situation
where all judges write separately, even when they may all reach the same
result."
Tables E (I) and (II) embrace all instances of agreement between justices as to
the resolution of a matter - without requiring the individuality of the judge to be
suppressed behind the single approach of a coalition. These tables set their sights
somewhat lower and record simply voting alignments not blocs, though of
course, the latter's inclusion is implicit as one form of agreement. The presence
58 'Two Justices are considered to have agreed whenever they joined the same opinion, as indicated by
either the reporter or the explicit statement of a Justice in the body of his 01' her own opinion. The table
docs not treat two Justices as having agreed it' they did not join the same opinion. even if they agreed in
the result of the case and wrote separate opinions revealing very little philosophical disagreement': (1996)
liD Harvard Law Review 135.369.
59 Smyth. '''Some lire More Equal than Others .••. above n 5. 197; Smyth. 'Judicial Interaction on the Latham
Court', above n 5, 333; and Smyth, 'Explaining Voting Patterns on the Lathnrn High Court 1935-50'
above n 5,99. Smyth expands upon this:
If a Justice dissents from the outcome of the case it is clear that he or she is not part of the successful
coalition that decided the CflSC. However, it might be less obvious that a Justice who writes a separate
judgment agreeing with the outcome. but not the reasons, of the other Justices should be treated the
same. But this follows once it is accepted that the reasons ore more important than the outcome.
60 Ibid. For a Canadian example. sec McCormick. above n 24.,f(J8-9: and Peter McCormick. 'Birds of a
Feather: Alliances and lnflucnccs on the Lamer Court 1990-t 997' (1998) 36 o.w()(}<!e Hall LuwJourna!
339.
61 Smyth himself acknowledges this point in the context of his most recent study when he says. 'in the
majority or cases during the period in which Latham was Chief Justice. all of the Justices delivered
separate judgments: therefore this study rOCliSCS on a by-produCl of High Court practice': 'Explaining
Voting Patterns on the Latham High Court 1935-50' above n 5. tOS.
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of a like approach to resolution of the dispute is used as an indicator of
substantive agreement between the particular justices, though obviously, the very
real limitation upon Tables E (1) and (II) is that there may indeed be significant
disagreement in the reasoning amongst the concurring judges. Whilst this
deficiency may be avoided by the identification of clear coalitions only, that
occurs, as I have just indicated, at the corresponding cost of ignoring the true
width of consensus behind a collection of individual opinions. The precise extent
of consensus lies somewhere between the results reached by the two methods - it
is certainly more than will be revealed through a coalition study yet highly
unlikely to be as much as indicated by simple concurrence in the result of the
Court. The final thing to note about Tables E (1) and (II) is that all clear voting
alignments are tallied regardless of success. So the agreement between a minority
of judges as to the outcome of a case is tallied alongside that of the majority.
Tables F (1) and (II) redress the breadth of Tables E (1) and (II) by only
recording participation in joint judgments - and, in accordance with the
comments in Part III, above, this does not include mere statements of
concurrence by other judges. The purpose of these tables, therefore, is to point to
the most explicit form of agreement there is - where two or more justices share
the one opinion so completely that it belongs to them in partnership.
In all four tables, the raw figures are the number of times a justice voted or co-
authored with each of his or her colleagues. This is then followed by an
indication of the frequency of each particular alignment or joint-judgment as a
percentage out of all the cases which that individual justice determined. These
tables should be read horizontally rather than vertically in order that the
percentages be consistent.
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TABLE E (II) - VOTING ALIGNMENTS: CONSTITUTIONAL CASES The figures presented in Tables E (I) and (II), above, go some way to
indicating the varying levels of influence of members of the Court. I stress that
throughout the remainder of the paper I am merely stating that the statistics
suggest the comparative sway which a judge may hold amongst his or her
colleagues. To arrive at much firmer conclusions in this respect would require all
sorts of studies of the Court and its output - some of which, such as substantive
analysis of the transcripts and judgments, are already performed by High COUli
scholars,62 while others, such as interviews with the justices themselves, scrutiny
of notes from conferences, draft judgments and other papers, would seem much
less likely." The statistical information compiled here is not an end in itself - it
hints at deeper currents,
In Table E (I) we see that all justices voted least with Kirby J than any of their
other colleagues', with the exception of Gaudron and McHugh JJ (both those
justices instead being marginally the least likely to vote with each other). A
glance along Justice Kirby's row shows that he only sided with any of his fellow
judges on approximately half of the possible occasions he had to do so. At the
other end of the spectrum, all members of the Court, barring Gaudron J, voted in
accord with Gleeson CJ more often than anyone else. However, it is worth noting
that Gurnmow J is not far behind, with Gleeson CJ and Gaudron J voting most
similarly to him, and Kirby J being just as prepared to favour a resolution in
conjunction with Gummow J as he is with the Chief Justice. Justice Hayne is also
noticeably dominant in attracting support from across the Court for his resolution
of matters. Of course, these results are not so surprising when one recalls the high
level of concurrence and very low rates of dissent of Gleeson CJ and Gummow
and Hayne JJ, demonstrated by Table 0 (I), above.
Turning to Table E (II), the picture in respect of constitutional cases is
interestingly altered. Instantly, we can see that proportionally the frequency of
alignment has increased across the board, indicating perhaps that the justices are
less creative in fashioning individual solutions to constitutional problems. Some
of the shifts as against what has just been observed in respect of the total
caseload are striking. The most obvious is the clear centrality of Gummow J as a
barometer to the entire COUli in constitutional cases.v' All six of his colleagues
..,
= ~ ~ ~ ~ ;? ~~ ::!? ~ ~ ::!?os 0 0 0
I=
0\ r-- t- t- o 0\ 0\ 00 -<t t- 0\
C"'"l " C"'"l ('r') \ci C"'"l c--i N r-.: r'1 "'"\D ('I-; :e :e :e :e ::!, :eu
... ~ ~ ~ ~ ;? ~Cl> ~ ~ ~ ~
I
~= 0- -<t 0\ 0 0 -<t C"'"l 00 V"'> r'1 t- o>. V"'>'Ci -<t c--i .",. - V"'> 'Ci C"'"l • r"l 'Cios 0\:: e e t:. e ~ :e
... ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
>. ~ ~ ~ ~
I
~ ~.c t- t- 0\ - .",. t- o V"'> V"'> -et- 00 0... C"'"l
('I
C"'"l 'Ci C"'"l 0 -<t vi r"l ('I 0:2 :e :e :e :e ~ ~
...




E V"'> N C"'"l co r"l t- o t- C"'"l 0: 0\ \D
E
V"'> r"l V"'> 0.; -e- 'Ci .",. r-.: V"'> N C"'"l 0.;
c3 ~ e t:. :e ~ :e
..,
.c ~ ~
~ ;? ~ »<;IOJ) ~
I
~ 0 ~ ~
:::l N -: 0\ C"'"l .",. .",. \D 0 t- o= .",. r"l -<t 0 r'1 r-.: -et- C"'"l '- \D 0 \Du t:. :e t:. ~ t:. ~~
...
= ;? ;? ;? ~ ;? ;?0 0
I





~ ~ ~ ~ ~
=
I
::!? ~ ::!? ::!? ~0 0 0
0 co r'1 ('I 0 V"'> - t- t- - 't: 0\ 0\ell .",. .",. V"'> 0 C"'"l V"'> r"l 0.;Cl> - '" N 0\~ e t:. ~ :e e :e
0
... ... ... .., ..,
U c: -;=1) ~ ... .., c:= 0 0 .2 Cl> os0 ... :::l E = :§ell -0 :: •.. >.Cl> :::l E S2 Ol -;~ os u =0 0 ~ c3 u
62 For a very clear example, sec George Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument in thc
Communist Port» Case' (1993) 15 Sydney Law Review J.
63 Though there arc notable exceptions: sec, eg, Clem Lloyd 'Not Peace but a Sword! - The High Court
Under JG Latham' (1987) II Adelaide LlIIv Review 175. The emergence of the Dixon diaries and their lise
in a new biography (Philip Ayres, D,rell Dixon (2003» may herald more research in this vein being
carried out in respect of the High Court. Certainly. this kind of thing seems much more prevalent in
respect of the United States Supreme Court. A recently published and fascinating resource is Del Dickson
(ed), The Supreme CUlItI in Conference (1940-1985) - The Private Discussions Behind Nearty ]00
Supreme Court Decisions (2001). A lot of leaking seems to occur through that Court's associates. In
addition to Bob Woodward and Seott Armstrong's notorious .•The Brethren (1979), see the more recent
controversial book by Edward P Lazarus. Closed Chambers (1998). The latter has been the subject of
much debate as to its propriety - for a potted Stll11l11<11'Y of which, see Michael C Darf, 'In Memoriam: In
Praise 01" Justice Blackmun ' (1999) 99 Cotumbiu Law Review 1397. 1398 (text or n 6).
64 Further to my earlier caveat about these statistics. this seems u useful description. Justice Gurnmow may
or may not make the constitutional weather - but he certainly is the 1110St reliable indicator as to what it is
going to be.
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voted with him more often than any other justice (though Callinan 1 was just as
likely to agree with Gleeson C1). Both the Chief 1ustice and Hayne 1 voted with
Gummow 1 in around 93 per cent of the constitutional cases on which they sat.
The ascendancy of Gummow 1 in constitutional matters may convey the
appearance that the Chief Justice has less influence in this area than he does
overall, but he has not been dramatically usurped. He remained a very likely
voting partner for all justices. The same is true of Hayne 1 - and additionally in
this context, Gaudron 1 also. With the exception of Hayne 1, all members of the
Court were noticeably more likely to find themselves aligned with Gaudron J
over other justices in constitutional cases than they were generally. The
remaining three justices still have the lowest alignment scores. But while, in this
subset of cases, Kirby 1 had a marginal increase in instances of agreement with
Gaudron and Gummow JJ relative to the other alignments of those judges, Justice
Callinan's position as a preferred voting partner relative to his other colleagues
appeared to slip with respect to all members.
Turning now to Tables F (I) and (II), below, we can place these early
perceptions about agreement amongst the justices to a more rigorous test based
upon the frequency with which they join in authorship of an opinion. Does that
particularly explicit indicia of consensus bear out the level of agreement
indicated by the patterns of similar voting we have just encountered?
TABLE F (I) - JOINT JUDGMENT AUTHORSHIP: ALL CASES
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TABLE F (1I) - JOINT JUDGMENT AUTHORSHIP: CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
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If anything, these tables present a clearer picture of the position in which the
justices often find themselves vis-a-vis each other. In respect of the entirety of
cases across the period as recorded in Table F (I), Gleeson CJ and Gummow and
Hayne 11 have a marked tendency towards co-authorship with each other. In
particular, the ~two justices were parties to joint judgments with each other in over
half the cases in which they presided. Additionally, all three were the favoured
writing partners of the other members of the Court. Barring Gaudron J being
Justice Callinan's third most frequent co-author over Hayne J, Gaudron,
McHugh, Kirby and Callinan 11 all joined the Chief Justice and Gummow and
Hayne 11 in co-authorship more often than they teamed with each other. Aside
from this trio, the most collaborative justice tended to be Gaudron J, followed by
McHugh J. And in a table with quite clearly discernible trends, none was more
apparent than that Kirby and Callinan 11 are the determined individualists of the
Court. The former teamed the least often with any of his colleagues - and by a
sizeable margin. Justice Callinan had a higher rate of co-authorship but was a
definite runner-up to Justice Kirby - his Honour was the next least likely partner
in a judgment for all those on the bench .
Much of this is simply translated to the specific setting of constitutional law
cases found in Table F (II), but there are a few observations worth making. While
the trio of Gleeson CJ and Gumrnow and Hayne 11 certainly retains its centrality,
Gaudron J appears to acquire a greater share of this. Admittedly, this is not to the
extent of her Honour having co-authored opinions the most often with any other
justice, but she ties in first place (with Gleeson CJ and Hayne J) for co-
authorship with Kirby J, and is the next most collaborative with Gumrnow,
Hayne and Callinan 11 (in respect of joining with the latter, she is tied with the
Chief Justice and McHugh J). Between this table and the last, there is almost no
change to the tail end at all - a very clear growth in individual expression as one
moves from McHugh J, to Callinan J and ultimately to Kirby J. The results in
respect of Kirby J are strikingly low and might be seen to reflect his Honour's
methodological isolation from the rest of the Court in constitutional cases .
Statements of constitutional principle such as that offered by Kirby J in Newcrest
Mining (WA) Ltd v C0l11111oITwealth65 and his marked intolerance for originalist
approaches.w has set his Honour on a course where the opportunity for joint-
judgment must be severely constrained while his brethren remain unpersuaded by
his approach. The same might be expected to a lesser extent in respect of
McHugh J who has also been fairly explicit about adhering to a particular
methodology." though the results in respect of his Honour are not so very
pronounced that we can readily make such an inference. This is probably also
largely due to the greater acceptance which Justice McHugh's approach would
appear to have found amongst his colleagues .
65 (1997) 190 CLR 513. 657-61. See also Justice Kirby's dissent ill Kartinveri l' COIII/I/OOII,",,!lh (1998) 195
CLR 337.
66 Justice Michael Kirby. 'Constitutional Interpretation ami Original lntent: A Form of Ancestor Worship'
(2000) 24 Mclbonrne Universitv Law Review I.
(,7 See Re Wakirn; Ex parte lV/eNalh-' (1999) 198 CLR I, 549-53; and Eastnum " The Q/le"/I (2000) 203 CLR
1,44-51.
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Table F (Ill), below, aims to give some dimension to the figures just provided
in F (II) by listing the joint judgment authors, and indicating by case reference
the occasions on which they partnered. This is not, as Ihave already made clear,
a study into voting blocs which successfully detell11ine. the outcome of a case.
Table F (III) is intended merely as a record of the vanous occurrences of co-
authorship:




Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, GUl11I110W, ( 161/489)
Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ
Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, GUI111110W, ( 169/607)
Kirby and Hayne JJ
6 Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, GUI11ITIOW, (159/1 09); ([ 63/576);Hayne and Callinan JJ (170/[11); ([71/[55);
(172/366); ([81/37[);
(191/543)
Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, GUlTI1110Wand (167/105); (170/659);
Hayne JJ ([ 72/625)
Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gurnrnow, Kirby and ( 156/563)
5
Hayne JJ
Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, GUI11ITIOW,Hayne and ( 192/2(7)
Callinan JJ
Gauelron, McHugh, GUI111110W,Kirby anel [2003] HCA 2'
Hayne JJ
Gleeson CJ, Gaudrou, Mcl-lugh, and GUIllIllOWJJ ( 187/409)
Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, and Hayne JJ (188/241 )
Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ (184/113): (191/1)
Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Glll11mOWand Callinan JJ ( 168/86)4 Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Havne JJ ( 166/259)
Gleeson CJ, Mcl-lugh, GUlTI1110Wand Havne JJ (176/644)
Gaudron, Mcl-lugh, GUI11ITIOWand Hayne JJ (177/436)
Gaudron, Mcl-lugh, GlII111110Wand Callinan JJ ( 164/520)
(\g Because nil [oint writing. whether tor the majority or minority. has been recorded in the foregoing rahlcs.
two or the cnse references do appear twice. These have been italicised, Additionally, tor the same I'cnso,l1s
present in respect of Table C. above. a simple tallying of the cases here is not going to produce panty
with the mIN figures used in other tables in this paper: see above n 50.
At the time of writing. the case of Pla;II/!!! S/571]1I1I] \' COIllIlIfIll\l'''o//iI [2003] I-ICA 2 is yet to he
reported in the Australian Lull' Reports.
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Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and GUlll11l0WJJ (177/3?9)
Gleeson CJ, McHugh, and Gurnrnow JJ (163/50 1); (183/645)
Gleeson CJ, McHugh, and Callinan JJ (165/171 )
Gleesol~ CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ (163/648); (173/619);
3 ([75/339); (185/111)
Gaudron, Mel-lush and Gurnmow JJ [20021 HCA 57t
Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ (166/159)
Gaudrou, Gumrnow and Hayne JJ (158/527); (168/8);
(180/30 I); (185/233);
(1891161); [20031 HCA 3:
Gleeson CJ and Gaudron J ( 160/638)
Gleeson CJ and Gununow J (16 [/318); (I 66/545);
(188/1)
Gleeson CJ and Kirby J ( 167/392)
Gaudron and GUl1l1110WJJ (176/219); (176/449)
2 Gaudron and Hayne JJ (187/529)
Mcl-lugh and Callinan JJ (161/318)
Gummow and Hayne JJ (162/ I): (163/270);
(165/171); (172/257);
(182/657); (185/1)
Hayne and Callinan JJ (177/329)
V CONCLUSION
With the recent c.hange in the composition of the Gleeson Court OCCUlTing
close to the end of Its first five years, the time was ripe for a basic empirical
approach to be taken to its work in order to try to discern patterns of behaviour-
bO,th ~nstitutionally and from the Justices as individuals. Of course, political
scientists and those legal academics taken with the jurimetrics movement would
be in, a position to subject this material to a range of sophisticated empirical
techniques with a view to teasing out conclusions of a more specific nature. The
n~ethods adopted here have been comparatively straightforward and devised
simply to capture a sense of the Court through examining not (as is more
commonly the case) how it explains itself, but rather how it acts,
w"e may con.s!der the statistics compiled and find our existing impressions
confirmed, Additionally, we may be mildly surprised by the frequency of various
h~ppenings where we had not previously perceived any trend. Doubtless,
different observers may be able to draw different conclusions from the material [
have presented here - and, of course, one must. apply a caveat given the
At the time of writing, the case or Roil"rl,I' \' Boss (2002J I-ICA 57 is yet to he reported in the .'/II,I'II'lI/;(l1I
Lml'Re/J01"t"'.
At the time of writing. the case of AII.I'/;II l' COIIIIIIOIIII' ••ulth (2003) I-ICA 3 is yet 10 he reported in the
Austrattan LlIlI' Reports,
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necessary limitations to the sample size. As such, I desist from the temptation to
read too much into the figures. However, two things evidently stand out in
respect of what the statistics indicate about the Gleeson Court on constitutional
law. The first is that the COUli seems to have had a solid core led by Gummow J
and comprising, in rough order of influence, Gleeson CJ and Hayne and Gaudron
11. Of course, to repeat my earlier qualification, that is the simple picture
suggested by the figures themselves. Further substantive analysis would
undoubtedly lead to better illumination of the degree to which the justices are
swayed by each other's views. But certainly, those four justices have most
consistently commanded the majority position of the Bench across the five year
period. The replacement of Gaudron J with Heydon J would not seem likely to
result in a dramatic weakening of the hold which that portion of the Court has in
constitutional matters. Whilst one should always be wary of making predictions,
it seems fair to suggest that Heydon J has given indications that he is likely to
find more conunon ground with the approach of the dominant trio than he is with
those less obviously in the centre of the court - McHugh, Kirby and Callinan
11.(,9
The second observation is that although Callinan J appears almost as likely to
dissent in constitutional matters, the indication from the tables of voting
alignments and joint judgment authorship is that Kirby J is really running his
own race. This tends to obscure the position of Callinan and McHugh 11 both of
whom are removed from the centre of the COUli to a not insignificant degree in
their own right. It also invites speculation about the competing fealties of
individualism and institutionalism. Justice Kirby's position on the Court is one
which clearly displays an overriding commitment to the former over the latter.
There is a wide body of literature which attempts to weigh the benefits and harm
which pronounced disagreement may have upon an institution." It is obviously
outside of the scope of this paper to explore those arguments now, but clearly the
prevalence of dissent in the present Court ensures that is a debate to which we
must stay attuned.
APPENDIX - EXPLANATORY NOTES
(Throughout these notes italics indicate constitutional cases)
The purpose of the notes contained in this appendix is to identify when and
how dis~reti~n has been exercised by the researcher in compiling the statistical
tables discussed throughout this paper. As the Harvard Law Review editors
stated, when explaining their own methodology, 'the nature of the errors likely to
be committed in constructing the tables should be indicated so that the reader
might assess for himself the accuracy and value of the information conveyed"."
CASE REPORTS INVOLVING A NUMBER OF MATTERS - HOW TALLIED
Reports containing a number of matters but tallied singly clue to a common substratum
of facts which leads to little or no distinction being drawn between the matters in the
judgments:"!
(I 6 1/399); (/6l/489); (162/577); (/63/50/); (/64/520); (/67/392); (167/575); (/68/8);
(169/385); (169/677); (171/613); (172/257); (173/665); (175/338); (/76/545);
(/77/329);73 (179/416); (179/625); (183/404); (/84/1/3); (/9///); (192/129); (193/1)
Reports tallied multiple times due to distinctions being drawn between the matters in
the judgments and orders made: 74
69 In particular. he seems to share a similar view to that of the Chief Justice in respect of the ability of
legalism to avert the dangers of activism: sec Chief Justice Murray Gleeson. 'Judicial Legitimacy' (Paper
presented at the Australian Bar Association Conference. New York, 2 July 2000); Justice Dyson Heydon,
'Judicial Activism's Threat to the Rule of Law' January-February 2003, Quadrant, 9.
70 For a recent sample, sec John Alder, 'Dissents in Courts of Last Resort: Tragic Choices?' (2000) 20
Oxford Jonrna! '!!' I.egal Studies 221; Bader Ginsburg, above n 39: Robert G Flanders Jr, 'The Utility of
Separate Judicial Opinions in Appellate Courts of Last Resort: Why Dissents Are Valuable' (1999) 4
Rogel" "";1/;0"'.'1 Universitv LaH' Review 401: Claire L'Hcurcux-Dube, 'The Dissenting Opinion: Voices of
the Future? (2000) 38 Osgoodo Hall La1\' ./0111'1I01 495: Robert K Little. 'Reading Justice Brennan: Is
There a "Right" to Dissent'?' (1999) 50 Hastings La1\' '/')//1'1I01 6X3; Kevin M Stack, 'The Practice of
Dissent in the Supreme Court' (1996) 105 Yale LOll' JOIIl'IIal 2235; William J Brennan, 'In Defense of
Dissents' (1986) 37 Hosting» LOII·./oul'lloI427.
71 Above n 9.
Ti I have argued elsewhere that multiple tallying of case reports containing marc than one matter may well
be justified where the matters are distinct and this is recapped below n 74. But conversely, multiple
tallying should be dispensed with where it is not absolutely necessary to convey the true extent of
consensus and disagreement amongst the bench. Such cases are those where there is so little difference
between the two or more separate matters in the report that the Court draws little distinction on the basis
of thcir separate Facts, and even parties. In short, the one answer will 'do' for all matters. The obvious
example of such a case is where a number of States challenge the same Commonwealth law. but private
law cases can be similarly treated where thc Court makes little or no distinction between the matters
within its written opinions.
73 There are six matters in (/77/319) (IISIC v Edensor Nominees Pty Lid (200 I)) which are essentially thc
Fallout from Re Wakim: Ex parte AkNall" (1999) 163 ALR 270 (sec below n 78). ivl20 is the central
matter and the common fact substratum was used to justify single tallying.
74 The purpose behind multiple tallying in such circumstances - and the competing arguments - arc
considered at length in Lynch, above n 12. 500-2. By tallying some case reports on the number of
separate matters they contain. the risk of inconsistency across subsequent statistics is alleviated. For an
example of the circumstance I am !lying to avoid. see (1961) 75 Harvard LOll' Review 40, 92: 'Some
distortion is introduced into the Table [showing voting alignments between justices] by the fact that when
the same Justices join in more than one opinion applying to a single decision, the Review notes two
agreements but only one decision: thus it is theoretically possible for two Justices to agree more times
than the number of eases in which they participate together' .Scparatc tallying also allows disagreement
amongst the bench to be isolated to one specific matter, rather than having it magnified in instances where
there is uctunlly u great deal of consensus. An cxnmplc of this is the report found at (190/601) which if
tallied singly would have required all seven members of thc Court to be noted as dissenting despite the
presence of' a clear majority in respect of one of the two matters contained in that report (the peculiarities
of (190/60 I) and how it was treated in compiling these statistics arc noted below linder' Decisions to tally
dissents warranting explanation': sec also. above, n 45).
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Tallied as two Tallied asfour
(/62//r; (176/644); (178/421 );76 (179/349); (180/1 );77 (180/145);
(180/402); (190/601); (19J1449); (/93/37); [2003) HCA 4.
(/63/270)7X
(185/335)~
DECISIONS TO TALLY DISSENTS WARRANTING EXPLANATION
(175/338) Gaudron J would grant special leave but dismiss the appeal. The
majority order is to dismiss the application for leave. Her
Honour's reason for the different order (which, admittedly, gives
the applicant the same practical result) is based upon her opinion
as to the operation of provisions of the Customs Act rather than
the central constitutional issue. However, this point of difference
from the majority leads to her variation of the resolution of the




or course. there nrc drawbacks to such an approach as well. This arises through distortion of the true
number uf opinions written - with particular effects upon the statistics for joint judgment authorship ((IS
,111 example. sec below n 7N with respect to tallying of the judgments in Re Wakim: Er parte JHcNa/~l'
(1999) 163 Al.R 270 - the case ill this sample with the most expansive effect ill this regard). BUI while
this inllutes raw datu, tile distorting effect is minimised through greater reliance upon the percentage
figures. And once again, identifying which cases huvc involved discretion 011the part of the researcher is
vital ill the interests of a transparent methodology. The choice 10 multi pic tally should bc noted and
justified - hence the inclusion or this table here. The scruimcnt from the Harvard Losv RCFif'Il'
accompanying n 71. above. is the guiding principle here.
75 Abeh« " Com/11(H!ln',,111J (19t)l) 162 ALR I is tallied twice for the purposes or compiling statistics or, the
totalnumber of cases, but only Ol1C,.:C with respect to constiturioual cases. This is because of the substance
or the two mailers dcult with by the judgments. (<1) the jurisdiction or the Federal Court and the meaning
of 'mnucr: and (b) Abcbcs application tor prerogative relict' 1I11c1~,rS 75(v), only the ronnel' involves 11
cousuunional qucstion.
76 There nrc actually lour mallei'S in (17N/421) _. two appeals by the Minister for Immigration I11ll1
Multicultural Affairs and two applications for prerogative relief limier s 75(v) of [he Constitution by
different visa applicants. (17X/421) is tallied twice. The uppenl and application concerning each
individual visa upplicunt have enough common ground 10 be treated together (ft should be noted that.
despite immediate appearances. this is 1101 equivalent to what is occurring in ("162/1) which. ailimugh only
involving one ViSH upplicanr \ViiS nevertheless tallied twice due to the considcrutions raised by the
Minister's appeal being quite distinct from those Hrising through the applicant's C~l~C lor prerogative relief
under s 75(v). However, as distinctions arc drawn between the dine-rent f:.IC(S applying to each applicant
in (17H/421), their respective litigation cu 11I1Ut simply be joined us a \....hole and is best treated ;15 two
separate matters.
'77 Exactly the same situation us for (17Xi421 ).
7X Nt.' 'Yakil11: J:.:r 1)(11'1(' IH(:Ntl/~,' (!t)l)l.)) 163 ALR 270 is tullicd us luu:: cases - both lor the constitutioual
subset i.111d in general, Although the four matters dealt with in (he report have significant tcuturcs or
commonality, there nrc enough distinctions to lead to members or the Court dealing with them separately
in their judgment». Additionully, three judges (Mcl-lugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ) arrive ut different
conclusions in respect of some of the rnnttcrs 011<\ not others. Whilst it was judged that multiple tallying
was preferable in this case, it must also be noted that this has ~l potentially distorting effect. This is
particulurly so in two respects: first, on the statistics lor cunstiturional t;,lses spccilicully where the sample:
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Callinan J dissents as well as McHugh J despite the headnote
accompanying the report. His Honour does not completely agree
with the final orders as he would not grant certiorari. As only a
partial concurrence in the final orders, this is tallied as a dissent.
Callinan J differs from the Court's orders by requiring interest to
be paid. The majority leaves that issue to the Federal Court to
determine. As only a partial concurrence in the final orders, this
is tall ied as a dissent.
Callinan J only allows the demurrers in part ancl is therefore
tallied as dissenting.
McHugh and Callinan JJ are tallied as concurring rather than
dissenting. The form in which they answer the questions asked
'01' the Court is slightly different from the majority (it is
expressed with less caution) - but essentially the same responses
are given.
The two matters contained in this report require the justices to
answer a number of discrete questions in respect of each. For
Matter S36 there is a clear 4:3 majority in favour of one set of
answers. This is not the case in Matter S89, the result of which is
arrived at by composite of the various diverse opinions (no fewer
than five). Only Justice Gaudrou's judgment completely reflects
the final orders of the Court in this matter. Consequently, and in
accordance with the methodological constraints requiring
absolute concurrence in order to avoid dissent, there are six
dissenting opinions in respect of Matter S89.7" It should be noted
that, as recorded above, these matters were tallied separately.
Kirby J agrees with the majority that the conviction should be
quashed but he does not order a new trial. As only a partial
concurrence in the final orders, this is tallied as a dissent.
Kirby J agrees with the majority that the appeal should be
dismissed but he does not concur on the matter of costs. As only
a partial concurrence in the tinal orders, this is tallied as a
dissent.
79 The upparcnt illogicnlity. yet necessity or arriving Hl.tllis result is considered in discussing rule (e) ill Pnrl
III. above. of this paper, Sec also Lynch. above n 12. 492-:, which discusses tile problems or I11ill1y
dissenters und institutional coherence across l11ullipk iSSlH.'S,
